Il concetto di sostanza nelle Categorie e nella Metafisica di Aristotele

This paper examines the concept of substance (ousia) in Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics through a critical and comparative analysis of the interpretations proposed by J. L. Ackrill and S. Menn. The study first addresses the longstanding debate concerning the status, function, and philosophical scope of the Categories, questioning whether they should be understood primarily as a logical–dialectical handbook or as an ontologically significant treatise. According to S. Menn, the Categories serve as a dialectical encheiridion, providing methodological tools for classification and argumentation without engaging in causal or metaphysical inquiry. By contrast, J. L. Ackrill maintains that the logical distinctions developed in the Categories reflect the real structure of being and thus constitute an initial sketch of Aristotle’s ontology.
The paper then focuses on the notion of substance as articulated in the Categories, especially the distinction between primary and secondary substances and the criteria that establish the priority of primary substances. It highlights how Menn interprets these criteria as purely dialectical rules for classification, while Ackrill reads them as expressing genuine ontological commitments.
Finally, the relationship between the Categories and Metaphysics is examined, showing how Aristotle moves from a non-causal, classificatory account of substance to a causal and explanatory investigation of substance in Metaphysics Ζ. The paper argues that, while significant methodological differences exist between the two works, the Metaphysics presupposes and develops the conceptual framework established in the Categories, revealing a fundamental continuity in Aristotle’s philosophical project.

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Dialog 58-4 Pitreți

Entendre la Parole qui sauve: Michel Henry, l’Incarnation et la Révélation chrétienne à la lumière de Dei Verbum

Michel Henry’s Paroles du Christ asks how Christ’s words can be heard as the Word of God. Reading Henry’s accounts of living speech, salvation, Incarnation and Eucharist alongside Vatican II’s Dei Verbum, this article argues that the inward efficacy of the Word cannot be theologically detached from Christ’s historical life, inspired Scripture and ecclesial reception. Jean Greisch’s objections concerning language, historical interpretation and creaturely life help delimit this Catholic reading. The study proposes a constructive dialogue rather than a doctrinal assimilation of Henry’s phenomenology.

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Dialog 58-3 Dassen

What kind of person does a just society need? Some Reflections Inspired by John Rawls

This article examines the early ethical thought of John Rawls through his thesis from 1942, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community, with particular attention to its implications for understanding the later development of his political philosophy. Written when Rawls was twenty-one and deeply engaged with Christian theology, his thesis presents an explicitly theological account of human nature, sin, faith, and community. His central claim is that the fundamental moral problem is not primarily the pursuit of the wrong object, or the satisfaction of inappropriate desires, but the distortion of personal relations and the destruction of community. Rawls distinguishes between natural and personal relations and argues that the latter constitute the proper sphere of ethical life. Sin is consequently understood as a repudiation of community, while faith represents an openness to God and to other persons through which community is restored.
This article argues that several themes already present in the young Rawls anticipate important elements of his mature philosophy: the moral significance of distinct persons, the rejection of society as a mere bargain among self-interested individuals, the priority of fair interpersonal relations over the maximization of a subjectiv good, and the importance of social institutions for sustaining relations of equality and mutual respect. At the same time, significant discontinuities must be recognized. The mature Rawls abandons the theological vocabulary of sin, grace, salvation, and divine revelation and develops a political conception of justice capable of accommodating reasonable pluralism. The article concludes by suggesting that the early thesis is valuable not because it provides a theological foundation for justice as fairness, but because it reveals an enduring anthropological concern underlying Rawls’ work: what kind of human relations and moral dispositions are necessary if a society is to become just?

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Dialog 58-2 Hălănduţ