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octombrie 30, 2026

Il concetto di sostanza nelle Categorie e nella Metafisica di Aristotele

This paper examines the concept of substance (ousia) in Aristotle’s Categories and Metaphysics through a critical and comparative analysis of the interpretations proposed by J. L. Ackrill and S. Menn. The study first addresses the longstanding debate concerning the status, function, and philosophical scope of the Categories, questioning whether they should be understood primarily as a logical–dialectical handbook or as an ontologically significant treatise. According to S. Menn, the Categories serve as a dialectical encheiridion, providing methodological tools for classification and argumentation without engaging in causal or metaphysical inquiry. By contrast, J. L. Ackrill maintains that the logical distinctions developed in the Categories reflect the real structure of being and thus constitute an initial sketch of Aristotle’s ontology.
The paper then focuses on the notion of substance as articulated in the Categories, especially the distinction between primary and secondary substances and the criteria that establish the priority of primary substances. It highlights how Menn interprets these criteria as purely dialectical rules for classification, while Ackrill reads them as expressing genuine ontological commitments.
Finally, the relationship between the Categories and Metaphysics is examined, showing how Aristotle moves from a non-causal, classificatory account of substance to a causal and explanatory investigation of substance in Metaphysics Ζ. The paper argues that, while significant methodological differences exist between the two works, the Metaphysics presupposes and develops the conceptual framework established in the Categories, revealing a fundamental continuity in Aristotle’s philosophical project.

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Dialog 58-4 Pitreți

octombrie 30, 2026

What kind of person does a just society need? Some Reflections Inspired by John Rawls

This article examines the early ethical thought of John Rawls through his thesis from 1942, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community, with particular attention to its implications for understanding the later development of his political philosophy. Written when Rawls was twenty-one and deeply engaged with Christian theology, his thesis presents an explicitly theological account of human nature, sin, faith, and community. His central claim is that the fundamental moral problem is not primarily the pursuit of the wrong object, or the satisfaction of inappropriate desires, but the distortion of personal relations and the destruction of community. Rawls distinguishes between natural and personal relations and argues that the latter constitute the proper sphere of ethical life. Sin is consequently understood as a repudiation of community, while faith represents an openness to God and to other persons through which community is restored.
This article argues that several themes already present in the young Rawls anticipate important elements of his mature philosophy: the moral significance of distinct persons, the rejection of society as a mere bargain among self-interested individuals, the priority of fair interpersonal relations over the maximization of a subjectiv good, and the importance of social institutions for sustaining relations of equality and mutual respect. At the same time, significant discontinuities must be recognized. The mature Rawls abandons the theological vocabulary of sin, grace, salvation, and divine revelation and develops a political conception of justice capable of accommodating reasonable pluralism. The article concludes by suggesting that the early thesis is valuable not because it provides a theological foundation for justice as fairness, but because it reveals an enduring anthropological concern underlying Rawls’ work: what kind of human relations and moral dispositions are necessary if a society is to become just?

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Dialog 58-2 Hălănduţ

august 23, 2026

Light between physics and theology: analogical convergence, epistemological limits, and the rationality of creation

This article examines the epistemological conditions under which light can function as a locus of dialogue between physics and theology, without concordism, reductionism, category error, or appeal to a “God of the gaps.” The guiding question concerns the methodological rules required for the two discourses to meet without one being reduced to the other. The thesis defended is that the only legitimate form of convergence is analogical and stratified: physics describes the properties, interactions, and cosmological role of light through empirico-mathematical methods, metaphysics interrogates the intelligibility of this description, and theology interprets creation in relation to the Logos and its finality — three distinct yet not isolated levels. The article draws on the author’s own interdisciplinary profile (engineering and theological formation) to propose a methodological model more precise than the simplified formula “science answers how, theology answers why,” refining it through the Thomistic rule of analogy and through four recent studies by the theologian Gabriel-Iulian Robu on the limits of conceptual language about the divine. The article discusses, as a methodological case study, the figure of the priest-physicist Georges Lemaître and formulates three serious objections to its own argument — epistemic asymmetry, the rhetorical risk of analogy, and the “God of the gaps” objection — to which it responds, concluding with three operational criteria for a responsible dialogue.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/DSTG1051

Dialog 58-1 Țurcanu

august 23, 2026

From “Let There Be Light” to “Lumen Christi”: Created and Uncreated Light in Scripture, Patristics and Liturgy

This article traces the biblical, patristic, and liturgical trajectory of the motif of light, from the first creative command to the Nicene confession “Light from Light” and to the sacramental actualization of Baptism as “illumination.” The guiding question is how the biblical motif of light moves from created reality and sign of God’s saving presence to christological, sacramental, and ecclesial predication, without conflating created light with God himself. The thesis defended is that the canonical arc from Genesis 1:3 to Revelation 21 does not establish a physico-metaphysical identity between cosmic light and God; rather, it reconfigures the symbol of light christologically and liturgically: what functions as a created gift in the Old Testament finds its personal fulfillment in Christ, while the created–uncreated distinction safeguards both divine transcendence and the possibility of human participation in grace. The method combines theological exegesis of representative biblical texts with their patristic reception and liturgical actualization, integrating, as an element of novelty, four recent studies by the theologian Gabriel-Iulian Robu on the phenomenology of gift, the iconic, and the hermeneutics of Genesis. The article’s contribution lies in joining, within a controlled argument, four registers usually treated separately: the exegesis of Genesis, the christological concentration in the Johannine and Pauline writings, the Nicene patristic reception, and the paschal liturgical actualization.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/YPVK4115

Dialog 57-8 Țurcanu

mai 21, 2026

The Divine Attribute of Mercy in Ioan Scotus Eriugena: Differences and Confluences with Jewish Kabbalah

This article undertakes a comparative theological and metaphysical analysis of the divine attribute of Mercy (Misericordia) as it is implicitly and explicitly understood in the Neoplatonic Christian philosophy of Ioan Scotus Eriugena and as it is systematically articulated by the Sefirah of Chesed (חסד) in Jewish Kabbalah, particularly within the Zoharic tradition. While separated by chronology, geography, and religious tradition, both Eriugena and the Kabbalists grappled with the fundamental paradox of a transcendent, unknowable God who is simultaneously an immanent, compassionate, and creative force. This study argues that Eriugena’s concept of Mercy is not a distinct, isolated attribute but is deeply embedded within his holistic vision of the divine nature (physis) as a process of creative self-manifestation, procession, and return (reditus). Mercy, for Eriugena, is the very dynamic of theophany—God’s act of creating, sustaining, and ultimately redeeming creation by becoming knowable within it. In Kabbalah, Chesed is a foundational Sefirah, the principle of unbounded love and grace, which must be balanced by Gevurah (Judgment) to ensure the stable manifestation of the cosmos. By juxtaposing Eriugena’s processional Mercy with Kabbalah’s emanational Chesed, this article illuminates profound confluences in their understanding of Mercy as the engine of creation and the promise of cosmic restoration. However, it also highlights crucial differences rooted in their respective Christological and Torah-centric frameworks, particularly concerning the means and finality of divine redemptive action. The analysis reveals a shared „grammar” of apophatic theology and emanationist metaphysics, suggesting a common heritage of Neoplatonic thought, while underscoring the unique theological syntheses achieved within Christian and Jewish mysticism.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/KONL7110

Dialog 57-5 Benescu

noiembrie 4, 2025

Being and Nonbeing: The Structure of the Absolute Transcendent, a Kabbalistic Perspective

This article examines the Kabbalistic view of God (the Absolute) as a dynamic interplay between Nonbeing (Ein Sof, the infinite abyss) and Being (the Sefirot, divine attributes). Using René Guénon’s metaphysics and Emmanuel Lévinas’s ethics, it argues this structure isn’t just abstract. Instead, the transcendent is experienced immanently through the ethical responsibility to other people. The divine is ultimately found in our ethical encounters.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/LHOI8256

Dialog 56-7 Benescu

august 7, 2025

Quando le parole diventano Credo

The presentation proposes a philosophical-theological reflection on the importance of language in general and theological language in particular as it emerges from the Nicene Creed. Starting from a series of considerations on the importance of words and language from a philosophical point of view (Plato, Aristotle, Wittgenstein, Humboldt, Paul Ricoeur, Umberto Eco), we will then proceed to concretize these considerations by choosing three concepts: the concept of birth/génitum; substance-consubstantial and de begotten/procédi. The effort and genius of the holy fathers in creating theological concepts and language will thus be highlighted. We will conclude with a reflection on current language in theology.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/DLSF9952

Dialog 56-2 Pitreți

aprilie 8, 2025

The Divine Attribute of Transcendence in Schopenhauer’s Work

This article undertakes an extensive examination of the concept of transcendence within the philosophical framework of Arthur Schopenhauer. While Schopenhauer is renowned for his immanent metaphysics, which posits the world as the self-objectification of a blind, striving Will, this paper argues that his system contains a unique and profound form of “immanent transcendence”. The analysis begins by establishing Schopenhauer’s explicit and trenchant critique of traditional, theistic notions of a transcendent Creator-God, which he dismisses as “popular metaphysics” incompatible with his Kantian- inspired epistemology. The core of the article then pivots to explore the three primary pathways through which Schopenhauer offers an escape, or a transcendence, from the suffering inherent in the phenomenal world governed by the Will and the principium individuationis. These pathways are: (1) aesthetic contemplation, where the subject becomes a “pure, will-less subject of knowledge,” momentarily transcending individuality to grasp the eternal Platonic Ideas; (2) ethical action rooted in compassion (Mitleid), which pierces the “veil of Maya” to recognize the shared suffering and fundamental unity of all beings; and (3) asceticism, the ultimate denial of the Will-to-live, which represents the final and most complete form of self-transcendence, leading to a state of nothingness or Nirvana. By analyzing these avenues, the article demonstrates that Schopenhauer does not merely negate transcendence but rather re-conceptualizes it, shifting its locus from an external, divine realm to an internal, experiential liberation from the deterministic chains of the Will. This secularized soteriology provides a powerful, albeit pessimistic, response to the fundamental human need to find meaning and relief from the existential condition.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/WYIH7179

Dialog 55-10 Benescu

aprilie 7, 2025

La reciprocità come principio costitutivo della volontà:la prospettiva fenomenologica dell’opera Il volontario e l’involontario di Paul Ricoeur

The approach with which Marion approaches Thomas’s Aquinas theology at the beginning of his phenomenological journey bears the imprint of Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology, but also of his personal hostility to the conceptual idolatry and atheism manifested in Nietzsche’s philosophy. What Marion contrasts with the conceptual idol is the icon and iconic thought. If the idol comes from looking at it, the icon looks at us, calls forth the vision, letting the visible become saturated with the Invisible. According to Marion, conceptual idolatry still seems a dangerous temptation in our times. Metaphysical categories, concepts can function as idols if they are generated by thought as objects appropriate to ‘God’ on the basis of its divine founding function.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/XJUW7074

Dialog 55-3 Pitreți

decembrie 21, 2024

Libre arbitre et déterminisme. Un plaidoyer pour le libertarisme agent-causal

In this article we aim to offer a plea for agent-causal libertarianism. This topic will be addressed in the context of the contemporary debate on free will and determinism. The importance of this millennial philosophical-scientific debate is obvious. If our constitution includes a physical nature, like the other elements of material Universe, then it too appears to be governed by the same physical laws. In this case, if the world is deterministic, “(i) all the laws of nature have this feature—they always specify a unique outcome for a given set of initial conditions—and (ii) everything that happens in the Universe falls under some laws of nature or other” Therefore, if this were the case, it seems that we do not possess the freedom we believe we have when we think that we could have done differently in the past, that our present choices are real, and that the future is still open. Since the world was characterized by certain conditions in the distant past, there seems to be only one way it can be today, tomorrow, and forever. Everything in this world seems to be already established, so that our freedom is, at best, an illusion. The illusion becomes even greater when certain findings in neuroscience seem to confirm it. If that were the case, then the stakes of this debate are ones of the highest possible, because by implication, with the illusion of freedom, everything becomes an illusion. Without freedom of the will, not only moral responsibility (with justice systems, religion etc.) and epistemic responsibility become an illusion, but even rationality itself, with all its deliberative and analytical processes, and with it, the knowledge of truth, the possibility of correcting errors of thought and finally the agent itself. The implications are catastrophic for such a world, since in it there is no room for good and evil, truth and falsehood, wisdom and folly, merit and demerit. With the listing of the implications, of which some are more or less aware, the schism among philosophers and scientists also begins. Our article attempts to provide a plea for agent-causal libertarianism in response to these problems. In doing so, we will first provide a classification of libertarianism in order to frame, define, and distinguish the libertarianism we defend. We will then highlight the incompatibility of agent-causal libertarianism with both determinism and other perspectives that promote event-type causation. Also, to clarify our position and introduce our arguments for the plea, we will compare compatibilism with our perspective. Finally, we will present six arguments in favor of agent-causal libertarianism. In this final section, in the part devoted to the objections to the second argument and the responses to the objections, we will also enter into dialogue with some experiments in neuroscience and experimental studies in the cognitive sciences.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.53438/YKUR2511

Dialog 54-4 Topala